【新刊速递】《亚太国际关系》(IRAP), Vol. 24, No.3, 2024 | 国政学人

题目：Introduction: The rise of formal institutions in the Asia-Pacific region through competitive regime complexity

作者：Motoshi Suzuki，日本京都大学法学院国际政治经济学教授

摘要：以精确和非授权为特点的正式地区制度的出现标志着亚太地区的重大转变。本特刊通过分析紧急流动资金供应、发展援助、清洁空气和劳工移民等政策领域，探讨了以前未曾研究过的制度向正式化转变的政治问题。为了指导我们的研究，这篇介绍性文章提出了一个概念框架，其中提出了一个新颖的论点：正式化是竞争性制度创建和灵活制度选择的结果，它促进了国家主权体系内的互利制度，以及缺乏中央协调权威的分散国家能力。在这种情况下，多个主要国家会启动制度以确保秩序制定特权。由于存在多种制度，小国从不对单一制度做出承诺；相反，它们会“货比三家”，以选择最符合其偏好的制度。在没有第三方强制执行的情况下，这些制度只有在与不断变化的国家偏好保持一致时才能实施。

The emergence of formal regional regimes characterized by precision and non-delegation signifies a major shift in the Asia-Pacific region. This special issue addresses the previously unexamined politics of institutional change towards formalization by analysing the policy realms of emergency liquidity provision, development aid, clean air, and labour immigration. To guide our research, this introductory article presents a conceptual framework that posits a novel argument: formalization is a result of competitive regime creation and flexible regime choice, fostering mutually beneficial regimes within a system of state sovereignty, and dispersed state capabilities lacking centralized coordinating authority. In such a context, multiple major states initiate regimes to secure order-setting privileges. Given the existence of multiple regimes, smaller states never commit themselves to a single regime; instead, they engage in forum shopping to select the regimes that best advance their preferences. Without third-party enforcement, these regimes are implementable only if they remain aligned with the evolving state preferences.

题目：Financial cooperation in the Asia-Pacific as regime complex: explaining patterns of coverage, membership, and rules

作者：William W Grimes and others，美国波士顿大学弗雷德里克·帕迪全球研究学院国际关系学教授

摘要：自1997年亚洲金融危机以来，东亚经历了从几乎没有区域金融合作到拥有多种合作安排的转变。本文重点关注紧急流动性供应这一问题领域，在该领域，全球（国际货币基金组织）、区域（清迈倡议多边化）和双边安排以复杂的方式共存和重叠，形成了一个制度综合体。虽然与1997年相比，整个体系提供了更多的选择和更多的资金，但它也提出了其在危机中如何运作的问题。本文展示了可能的债权国和可能的借款国的国家偏好如何相互作用，从而形成了当前的综合制度，以及它们将如何进行政治妥协和合作中处理仍然存在的不确定性。本文认为，制度复合体的演变和当前形态是由主要国家利用或阻挠权力不对称的努力所驱动的。

Since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, East Asia has gone from having virtually no regional financial cooperation to having multiple cooperative arrangements. This article focuses on the issue area of emergency liquidity provision, where global (International Monetary Fund), regional (Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization), and bilateral arrangements co-exist and overlap in complicated ways, forming a regime complex. While the overall system offers more options and greater funding than were available in 1997, it also raises questions about how those levels will operate in a crisis. This article shows how national preferences of likely creditor and likely borrower countries have interacted to create the current regime complex, as well as the political compromises and remaining uncertainties about how they will work together. It argues that the evolution and current shape of the regime complex have been driven by the efforts of key states to take advantage of or thwart power asymmetries.

题目：Aid coordination through competition? Unintended consequences of China–Japan rivalry in foreign aid policy in Asia

作者：Hiroyuki Hoshiro，日本东京大学社会科学研究所教授

摘要：中日两国在亚洲的权力竞争仍在继续，其政治对抗已延伸到对外援助领域的竞争。日本过去在该地区的对外援助中占主导地位，而中国则通过基础设施援助超越了日本。日本尚未制定正式的地区援助和发展框架。然而，本文认为，中日之间无意间的捐助协调已经实现。两国提供的援助并不重叠，因为每个国家都倾向于关注数量有限的受援国，这就形成了一种自然的分工。为什么两国的竞争会导致援助协调？本文通过研究日本和中国的援助行为回答了这一问题，并发现具有讽刺意味的是，正是两国在经济基础设施援助方面的共同利益造成了这种局面。

The power struggle between China and Japan in Asia continues, with their political confrontations extending to foreign aid rivalry.  While Japan used to dominate in foreign aid in the region, China has overtaken it with its infrastructure assistance.  No formal regional aid and development framework has yet been developed here.  However, this article argues that unintentional donor coordination between China and Japan has been realized.  The aid provided by the two does not overlap as each country tends to focus on a limited number of recipients, and a natural division of labor originates.  Why has their rivalry resulted in aid coordination?  This article answers the question by examining the behaviors of Japanese and Chinese aid and finding that, ironically, it is their shared interest in economic infrastructure aid that creates such a situation.

题目：Navigating environmental cooperation on air pollution amid political competition in East Asia 

作者：Azusa Uji，日本京都大学法学院副教授

摘要：东亚国家最近通过东亚酸沉降监测网络提升了清洁空气方面的区域合作，为多种污染物的监测和能力建设援助做出了周密安排。这表明东亚国家已摆脱了早先在酸沉积问题上安排模糊的非正式制度。然而，尽管发生了这一显著变化，现有文献很大程度上仍未探讨清洁空气区域治理的正式化制度。本研究则填补了这一空白，借助制度复杂性和合法化理论分析了正式化的动态。研究侧重于2012年2021 年这十年间，采用文献分析和访谈的方法。研究结果表明，政府通过制度竞争和选择调整制度安排，积极追求国家利益，从而推动正式化进程。通过区域和全球机构之间的互动，实现了对多种污染物危害性的共同认知，这对就制度安排达成一致起到了催化作用。

East Asian countries have recently upgraded their regional cooperation for clean air through the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia, with elaborate arrangements for monitoring and capacity-building assistance for multiple pollutants.  This represents a departure from the earlier informal regimes with vague arrangements on acid deposition.  However, despite this notable shift, this formalization in the regional governance for clean air remains largely unexplored in the existing literature.  This study fills this gap by analysing the dynamics of formalization through aid from theories of regime complexity and legalization.  It focuses on the decade from 2012 to 2021, employing documentary analysis and interviews.  The results reveal that governments actively pursue their state interests by adjusting institutional arrangements through regime competition and selection that drive formalization.  Sharing cognition of the hazardousness of multiple pollutants achieved through interactions between regional and global institutions serves as a catalyst for reaching an agreement on the arrangements.

题目：Migration governance in East and Southeast Asia 

作者：Erin Chung, 美国约翰·霍普金斯大学政治学教授；James F Hollifield, 美国南卫理公会大学政治学教授；Yunchen Tian，Yunchen Tian美国圣马丁大学政治学助理教授

摘要：本文通过比较使东南亚国家（尤其是印度尼西亚、菲律宾和越南）与东北亚两个最大的劳动力移民接受国（日本和韩国）之间的劳动力移民流动制度化的客工计划，解释了东亚和东南亚的移民治理。本报告展示了这些计划如何导致目的地国之间对技术劳动力的竞争加剧，同时促进东南亚和东北亚国家之间的更大移民流动。双边经济协议在保护移民权利和促进移民融入目的地国方面产生了极不平衡、欠发达的框架。本文还为复合相互依存和全球移民治理理论提供了见解，并说明了移民相互依赖（Migration Interdependence）如何既能导致合作，又能导致冲突。

This article explains migration governance in East and Southeast Asia by comparing guestworker programs that have institutionalized labor migration flows between Southeast Asian countries (especially Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam) and the two largest Northeast Asian recipients of labor migration, Japan and South Korea. It demonstrates how these programs have led to heightened competition for skilled labor between countries of destination, while facilitating greater migration flows between countries in Southeast and Northeast Asia. Bilateral economic agreements have engendered highly uneven, underdeveloped frameworks for protecting migrant rights and facilitating migrant integration in countries of destination. The analysis also provides insights into theories of complex interdependence and global migration governance, and shows how migration interdependence (MI) can lead to both cooperation and conflict.